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A CIVIL LIBERTARIAN LOOKS AT SECURITIES REGULATION
BY MONROE H. FREEDMAN*
Since I am a stranger to this group and, indeed, to this area of the
law, it seems appropriate that I begin by introducing myself and indi-
cating the perspective-from which I view securities regulation. I suppose
I would be characterized as an old-fashioned New Deal Democrat. I
therefore approach the area of securities regulation with a great deal of
sympathy with the rights of the little guy and a good deal less sympathy
with those whom the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC) Chair-
man Ray Garret:, Jr., recently referred to as "robber barons, princes of
privilege, [and] malefactors of great wealth."' Moreover, as a civil lib.
ertarian, I have been primarily concerned with free speech, equal protec-
tion, and the due process rights of criminal defendants, with particular
regard to indigents. I think it is fair to say, therefore, that I began my
inquiry into securities regulation with a minimum of compassion for
those who are regulated. Nevertheless, I was genuinely shocked with
the implications of securities regulation practices and policies as they af-
fect two inseparable concepts that must be of concern to all of us-the
rights of individuals in a free society, and the independence of the Bar.
Let me begin with three propositions. The first is that the promoters
of securities are entitled to the same constitutional rights as are the push-
ers of narcotics. The second is drawn from a quotation that I have
used on a number of occasions in a rather different context. It comes
from the Harvard Civil Liberties/Civil Rights Law Review, which
stated: "It has become both professionally and legally dangerous to be a
lawyer representing the poor, minorities, and the politically unpopular." 2
To that group that stands in professional and legal jeopardy, I would
now add another category: attorneys representing members of the se-
curities industry. My third proposition (and this one I would expect to
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be the least popular with this audience) is that the fault lies with the
securities Bar itself. As one highly experienced and highly regarded
securities lawyer commented to me, "The professional training of the
New York securities Bar is to cave in." Another equally prominent au-
thority said, "The securities Bar has abdicated its responsibilities to its
clients in deference to the Commission." a
The Commission starts with the best of motives. It has an important
job to do in the public interest, and it has been provided with a grossly
inadequate staff with which to achieve its goals. That, of course, is a
familiar problem. I have heard the same justification given in virtually
every case of police abuse and every prosecutorial circumvention of con-
stitutional rights with which I have been involved. The Commission has
sought to resolve its difficulty in four ways. The first is by dragooning
members of the private Bar, without benefit of Civil Service status, as
federal police and prosecutors of their own purported clients. The Com-
mission itself has observed that "this Commission with its small staff,
limited resources, and onerous tasks is peculiarly dependent on the pro-
bity and the diligence of the professionals who practice before it."4  Ac-
cordingly, "Members of this Commission have pointed out time and time
again that the task of enforcing the securities law rests in overwhelm-
ing measure on the Bar's shoulders."' The SEC attorney has indeed be-
come, in the phrase of Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr., "another cop
on the beat."'
A second method used by the Commission is a system of investiga-
tion through the use of private spies and informers, euphemistically
called "in-house compliance," which includes telephonic eavesdropping
without any warrant or, indeed, without any basis that approaches a con-
stitutional justification. To a great extent, that aspect of securities in-
vestigation is carried on under the auspices of the National Association
of Securities Dealers and the New York and American Stock Exchanges.
Although the activities of those organizations are commonly referred to
as "self-regulation," they are in fact closely controlled by the SEC as
an integral part of its enforcement process. Third, the Commission em-
3 Almost none of the many lawyers with whom I have spoken was willing to be identified
by name. That, in itself, is some indication of the unhealthy rehtionship between the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the lawyers who practice before it. However,
in each instance in which I refer to information obtained in an interview with a lawyer,
I subsequently received confirmation from at least one reputable and experienced attorney
that the information I had received was consistent with his or her experience.
4 In the Matter of Emanuel Fields, 2 S.E.C. Docket 1, 4-5, n.20 (July 3, 1973).
5Id.
6 Sommer, Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, N.YL.J., Jan. 30, 1974
at 4, col. 5.
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ploys other investigatory and adjudicatory practices (discussed below)
that are probably unparalleled in our jurisprudence for their open vio-
lation of basic rights. Fourth, the Commission depends upon intimida-
tion of individuals, business firms, and attorneys through aggressive
abuse of its power over the economic life and death of those subject to
its jurisdiction.
For example, an investigation may be initiated and conducted with-
out any notice to the person involved until he or she (and the rest of
the world) reads about the commencement of formal proceedings in
the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times.7 The proceedings
are conducted by staff members who combine the roles of investigator,
prosecutor, and judge. Moreover, staff members have been known to
harbor the attitude that respondents are "unworthy" of the respect due
to any citizens by government officials and that they are therefore not
entitled to basic rights.8 It is also entirely possible that the administra-
tive law judge will have received ex parte information and will be com-
mitted, prior to any formal hearing, to a conclusion of guilt. Illustra-
tive of the attitude of SEC staff members toward the citizens subject to
their regulation is the comment of Mr. Stanley Sporkin, Associate Di-
rector of the Enforcement Division of the SEC. When challenged at a
public meeting with charges of violations of fundamental rights, Mr.
Sporkin replied that such practices were justified because "these are the
fat cats we are dealing with."'
I have received numerous illustrations of violations of due process in
the course of SEC investigations. For example, if a prosecutor were to
discourage a witness from talking to a defense attorney, it would be
grounds for disciplinary action. As stated in the American Bar Asso-
ciation publication, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function, "A
prosecutor should not obstruct communication between prospective
witnesses and defense counsel. It is unprofessional conduct to advise
any person to decline to give information to the defense."10 The Stan.
dards explain
Prospective witnesses are not partisans; they should be regarded as
impartial spokesmen for the facts as they see them. Because witnesses
do not "belong" to either party, it is improper for a prosecutor, defense
counsel, or anyone acting for either to suggest to a witness that he not
7 Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 23 Bus. LAW. 891, 896 (1967).
8 1d. at 893.
9 Letter from Professor Henry G. Manne in The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 10, 1973,
at 6, col. 4.




submit to an interview by opposing counsel. It is not only proper but
it may be the duty of the prosecutor and defense counsel to interview
any person who may be called as a witness in the case (except that the
prosecutor is not entitled to interview a defendant represented by coun-
sel)."
Despite that clear rule, it is common for SEC staff members to instruct
witnesses not to discuss their testimony with counsel for respondents,
and, in at least one case, an attorney was threatened with being prose-
cuted for obstruction of justice simply for making efforts to interview a
government witness.
A respondent may be subpoenaed without being given notice that
he or she is a target of the investigation and may even be purposely mis-
led into the erroneous belief that he or she is not the target. Respon-
dents are also interrogated without being given advance knowledge of
the contents of the order instituting the investigation against them.
Such practices necessarily have the effect of depriving the individual of
an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense and they increase the
likelihood that the respondent will be trapped into making damaging
errors in the course of the investigation. An attorney who requests nec-
essary time to prepare a defense or who invokes the attorney-client
privilege may be asked rhetorically, "Are you saying your client won't
cooperate?" In one case, when the attorney indicated that the client in-
tended to invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination,
he was advised by the SEC staff member, "That's the best way to guaran-
tee an indictment."
Despite the Commission's general insensitivity to the rights of those
subject to its jurisdiction, it has been strangely solicitous to ensure that
respondents use separate counsel. In fact, during an investigative hear-
ing the Commission imposes a rule of sequestration upon counsel as well
as witnesses, thereby making it impossible for a lawyer to represent ef-
fectively more than one party before the Commission. Those tactics
have been defended on the ground of protecting the rights of respon-
dents by preventing possible conflicts of interest on the part of the at-
torneys. The objective observer might well conclude, however, that the
true motive is to divide and conquer or, at least, to subject the parties to
enormous and unnecessary expense and place them at a severe tactical
disadvantage. In a somewhat analogous case, a prosecutor in the Dis-
trict of Columbia was recently admonished by Bar Counsel for the Dis-
ciplinary Board for prejudicing the fair administration of justice by
telling a prospective defense witness that the witness was exposing him-
1 Id. at § 3.1, Comment c.
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self to potential prosecution and that he should seek his own counsel
before testifying.12
Another serious problem in securities regulation is prejudicial pub.
licity. Indeed, it has been noted that "the relief sought by the Com-
mission, even if granted, may not be as significant or as onerous a sanc-
tion as the publicity attendant upon the commencement of the proceed.
ing."' 3  Although one would expect; therefore, that staff members of
the Commission would be particularly sensitive to the problem of ruin.
ing reputations by inconsiderate investigative tactics, the fact is precisely
to the contrary. Potential witnesses have been told by SEC staff investi-
gators, "We have reason to believe that Mr. Y is a crook, and that you
are one of his victims." Not long ago, a staff member was quoted in
Business Wleek magazine accusing a respondent in a pending proceed-
ing as carrying on "the biggest rip-off" he had ever seen.1
The investigative hearing is frequently the most critical stage, for
practical purposes, in the adjudication of guilt or innocence. Or, more
accurately, if a decision is made to proceed to a formal hearing, that de-
cision itself may well destroy personal reputations, corporate good will,
and entire business ventures. I was interested to note, therefore, that
without any prompting on my part, the phrase most frequently used by
attorneys with experience in investigative hearings was "Star Chamber."
Rights of examination and cross-examination of witnesses are severely
restricted. Critical documents, including a copy of the order authoriz-
ing the investigation and defining its scope, are not provided to respon-
dents in advance. They may be examined, but not copied, at the hear-
ing itself. One attorney recounted how he had been "laughed at"
when he asked for a copy of the charges against his client. Opportu-
nity for rebuttal is rarely provided. In addition, the Commission has re-
jected recommendations by the Wells Committee"; and by Milton Free-
manI' that it provide a right to be heard by the Commission before the
Commission rubber-stamps a staff decision adverse to a respondent. Per-
haps most importantly, the Commission has also rejected recommenda-
12 Letter from Fred Grabowsky, Esq., to Herbert B. Hoffman, Esq., Oct. 17, 1973. The
letter eked ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCIPLINARY RULE 1-102(A)
(5); AMER. BAR ASSN., STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 3.2
(1971); and Informal Decision No. 575 (1965) AMER, BAR ASSN., OPINIONS ON PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS (1967).
13 SEC, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMIIT-rE ON IINFORCEM13NT POLICIES AND
PRACTICES (1972). The Report was prepared by John A. Wells, Manuel F. Cohen, and
Ralph H. Demmler, and is commonly referred to as the Wells Report.
14 Business Week, Nov. 17, 1973, at 36.
15 Wells Report, supra note 13 at 19-20, 31-33.
16 Freeman, sapra note 7 at 894-95.
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tions that it issue notice when proceedings have been terminated.17 Thus,
respondents are left in the untenable position of never knowing whether
proceedings against them have ended or whether an indictment might
issue many months or even years later. Such tactics impose tremendous
and unconscionable pressure to resolve the matter conclusively by enter-
ing into a consent decree with the Commission on its terms.
Where, in all of this, are the lawyers? What has turned the securi-
ties Bar from the attorneys' traditional role of champions of their clients
into wholly owned subsidiaries in the enforcement conglomerate? Why,
indeed, to quote the words of an SEC Commissioner, are "all the veri-
ties and truisms about attorneys and their roles in question and in jeop-
ardy"?s
In order to intimidate the lawyers, the Commission uses what Chair-
man Garrett has confessed are "overly crude weapons."'" He has ex-
plained that the Commission "keep[s] the pressure on the professionals"
to do the government's job through "suitable incentives.' 0': Those in-
centives include "rewards" as well as "punishments." 2'
The rewards consist of favored treatment to some lawyers in their
appearances before the Commission. For example, some few attorneys
do receive the opportunity, denied to others, to appear before the Com-
mission before a staff recommendation is approved. . That, of course,
represents a conscious effort to encourage lawyers to trade off the rights
of some clients in order to curry favor with the Commission and there-
by advance the rights of other clients. It also amounts to a denial of
equal protection of the laws to the clients of those lawyers who are not
so favored.
The punishments are directed toward intimidating attorneys into
foregoing zealous advocacy on behalf of their clients. One attorney, en-
gaged in vigorous defense of his client's rights, was advised by a staff
member that he should "take a look at the National Student Market-
ing complaint," in which attorneys were named as respondents. Indeed,
an attorney may appear before the Commission on behalf of a client,
and receive no warning that the attorney is also a target of the investi-
gation. Attorneys have been threatened with subpoenas in the course
of hearings, and one attorney arrived at the Commission offices to repre-
sent a client, only to be served with a subpoena upon arrival.
17Wells Report, supra note 13, at 20; Freeman, supra note 7, at 895.
Is Sommer, supra note 6 at 4, col. 6.
19 Garrett, supra note 1, at 15.
20 Id. at 10.
21id.
2 Freeman, supra note 7, at 895.
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The Bar at large has also been reminded that an entire law firm
might be disbarred or suspended for a lapse on the part of a single firm
member 2 3 -a sanction that is particularly vicious in view of the fact that
disbarment or suspension may result from simple negligence without any
showing of improper intent.24  In one case it was necessary for an at-
torney to go to the United States Court of Appeals to obtain reversal of
a two-year suspension on a charge of improper conduct five years pre-
viously.2 5 Although the court ultimately found the Commission's evi-
dence to be insufficient to support a finding of impropriety, and directed
the Commission to vacate its order against the attorney, the intimidating
effect of such abuses of power is plain. The problem is further com-
pounded by the vagueness of the standards applied by the Commission.2
The damaging impact of that kind of tactic upon the attorney-client
relationship is illustrated by the comment of one client to an attorney
after the attorney had given some overly cautious advice. The client
asked, "Are you saying that for my protection or for your own?"
One of the most revealing comments that I have heard illustrating
the unhealthy relationship between the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the attorneys who practice before it was made by William
J. Casey, a former Chairman of the SEC, in a speech at the Securities
Regulation Institute Conference in San Diego. Mr. Casey had heard
that, earlier the same day, I had criticized the Commission and the law-
yers who practice before it, but he did not know that I had addressed
myself to Chairman Garrett's system of "rewards and punishments."
Unaware, therefore, that he was confirming my criticism, Mr. Casey re-
lated the story of an irate attorney who appeared at the Commission to
protest that a staff attorney had been engaging in arbitrary conduct to.
ward the attorney's client. With obvious approval, as well as relish, Mr.
Casey quoted the staff attorney as saying, "Listen, if we weren't as arbi-
trary as we are, you wouldn't be as fat as you are." The high-minded
moral that former Chairman Casey drew from that episode was, "So
keep in mind that your practice depends upon what the Commission
does." Having established that securities regulation attorneys reap fi-
nancial rewards from the privilege of practicing before the Commis-
* sion, Mr. Casey then went on to admonish the attorneys that they have a
2-3 Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some
Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1973).
24 S..C. v. Spectrum, Ltd., 54 F.R.D. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
2 5 Kivitz v. S.E.C., 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2O See Shipman, The Aeed for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Liabilitis of At.
torneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 231 (1973).
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professional responsibility to "force" their clients toward "a process of
disclosure."
There are two justifications that are frequently suggested in support
of the revolutionary27 notion that attorneys in the field of securities reg-
ulation should play the role of government enforcers and informers
against their clients rather than the traditional lawyers' role of counsel-
lors and advocates. The first justification is that securities regulation
frequently involves civil or administrative sanctions only, and not crim-
inal penalties. It is contended, therefore, that due process rights are in-
applicable. The SEC has taken the position, however, that it has the
power simultaneously to pursue civil, administrative, and criminal liti-
gation against identical defendants in common fact situations. 8 More-
over, it is well established that governmental action that has the effect
of impairing important property rights must comply with due process
standards even in a purely civil context. Thus, before the government
can terminate welfare rights,29 permit garnishment of wages by a credi-
tor,30 permit replevin of a television set,' or suspend a driver's license,3"
the affected party must be afforded both notice and an opportunity to be
heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,'" 3 and "the
fact that there is a later constitutionally fair proceeding does not alter
the result."3 4 Moreover, the court has specifically recognized that such
rights must be respected where "any significant property interest" is af-
fected, even though the deprivation "may only be temporary."'13 In the
light of those principles, it seems dear that a business person should not
be deprived of the property right represented by business good will, as
a result of fundamentally unfair tactics employed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission in an investigative proceeding.
A second justification that is often asserted for compelling the SEC
lawyer to work for the government rather than for his or her client is
the notion that there is an essential distinction between the litigating
attorney and the office attorney. What that argument ignores is that our
legal system is basically an adversarial one, and every lawyer-whether
2 7The characterization is that of Commissioner Sommer. Sommer, supra note 6, St
4, col. 6.
28 S.E.C. v. Stewart, 476 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1973). See especially the dissent by Judge
Timbers, who is former general counsel of the SEC.
29 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
30 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
31 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
32 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
33 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80.
34 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261.
35 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82, 84, 86.
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drafting a contract, counseling in a business venture, writing a will, or
performing any other service on behalf of a client-acts in such a way
as to protect the client from being at a disadvantage in potential future
litigation. Particularly should that be so, in a free society, when the po-
tential adversary is the government itself. In that sense, and it is a cru-
cial one, every lawyer is an advocate, irrespective of whether he or she
ever enters a courtroom.
In elaborating the fallacious distinction between the litigating attor-
ney and the office attorney, Professor Morgan Shipman, in his remarks
at the San Diego Conference, adverted to Disciplinary Rules 4-101 and
7-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His reliance, how-
ever, was misplaced. Under DR 4-101 the lawyer is required to pre.
serve the confidences of the client. Even the lawyer who knows that the
client intends to commit a crime is not required to reveal that fact, but
is merely permitted to do so. It is true tha: DR 7-102(B) (1) says
that a lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that the cli-
ent has perpetrated a fraud must call upon the client to rectify the fraud.
Further, the original ABA draft goes on to say that if the client refuses
to rectify the fraud, the lawyer "shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal." Significantly, however, that quoted provision was
put to a vote of the Bar in the District of- Columbia (the jurisdiction in
which the SEC is located), and by an overwhelming vote of the Bar,
the clause was eliminated. Thus, although the lawyer does have an ob-
ligation to urge the client to correct any false statement to the SEC, the
lawyer has no obligation to report the client to the authorities if the
client declines to take the lawyer's advice.
In sum, therefore, securities regulation is characterized by denial of
the right to counsel, corruption of the independence of the Bar and of
the traditional professional standards of attorneys' obligations to their
clients, a police-state system of investigation, and denial of a variety of
other basic due process rights. Even if a balancing test were appro-
priate in such a context, what is there to place on the other side of the
scale?
Accdrding to one commentator, the field of securities regulation has
recently seen some "spectacular . . . failures" that rival any securities
frauds prior to the passage of the federal securities regulation laws.
According to the same commentator, in the last few years we have seen
some "truly monstrous financial debacles," in which "hundreds of
th6.usands of persons have lost hundreds of millions of dollars" through
investments in securities that had received "the full treatment" under the
securities laws. That is, indeed, a harsh judgment of gross failure of the
(Vol. 35
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securities regulation system. It is significant, therefore, that those ob-
servations were made not by some chronic critic of federal regulation,
but by SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr., in an address to the American
Bar Association.3
Unquestionably, the government's purposes are beneficent and those
responsible for securities regulation are well meaning. As Justice Bran-
deis once observed, however, "Experience should teach us to be most
on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are
beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well meaning, but without understanding.""
I do not feel competent to pass judgment upon the wisdom of regulat-
ing sales of securities. It is clear to me, however, that if securities regu-
lation is worth doing, it is worth providing sufficient governmental re-
sources to do the job in a way that comports with due process of law,
and in a way that does not corrupt the attorney-client relationship and
gravely threaten the independence of the Bar, which is essential to the
maintenance of a free society.
36 Garrett, supra note 1.
3 7 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
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